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I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Multinational corporations were meant to be reassured by the protections 
incorporated into bilateral and regional investment agreements. However, 
judging from the growing number of claims filed with the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and other arbitration vehicles—
more than three hundred and fifty treaty-based, investor–state disputes as of 
the end of 2009—it is evident that many corporations have found out the hard 
way that sovereign states are not always suitably restrained by the international 
treaties they have signed and ratified.1 
Likewise, private-sector commercial-bank creditors, bondholders, and 
suppliers—even official bilateral and multilateral lenders—have come to learn 
by repeat experience that financial contracts entered into by sovereign 
borrowers, no matter how airtight and well-intentioned at the time they were 
crafted and signed, can be perverted or ignored by governments lacking in 
ability or willingness to pay. 
This article illustrates this point by focusing on the case of Ecuador, a 
country whose governments have defaulted nine times on foreign-currency 
bonds and numerous times to foreign commercial-bank creditors and others, 
such that the sovereign has been in default for at least 109 out of the last 184 
years—sixty percent of the time from 1826 through 2010.2 By its own reckoning, 
the government has been in arrears on interest payments to some foreign 
creditor or another in each and every year starting in 1987.3 The lesson from 
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 1. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Geneva, Switz., 2010, 
World Investment Report, at 83. 
 2. Ecuador’s first default took place when it was part of the Republic of Gran Colombia, which 
became the nations of Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela in 1830. See generally David T. Beers, 
Commentary, Sovereign Defaults At 26-Year Low, To Show Little Change in 2007, STANDARD & 
POOR’S, Sept. 18, 2006, at 18. 
 3. BANCO CENTRAL DEL ECUADOR, 80 AÑOS DE INFORMACIÓN ESTADÍSTICA ch. 2 tbl.2.12 
(2007), available at https://www.bce.fin.ec/documentos/PublicacionesNotas/Catalogo/Anuario/80anios/ 
indice.htm; Banco Central del Ecuador, Movimiento de la Deuda Externa Pública, INFORMACIÓN 
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abundant history is that, despite decades of innovations in international-loan 
and bond contracts involving sovereign financial obligations—courtesy of some 
of the best minds in New York, London, and beyond—lawyers, bankers, 
analysts, and investors are best advised to operate under no illusions: sovereigns 
are indeed sovereign, independent of the laws of other nations. Those who 
harbored the hope that Argentina’s bad behavior as a sovereign debtor was a 
major exception that would not soon be repeated should be persuaded by the 
case of Ecuador that, although the absence of sovereign willingness to pay 
remains rare, it is not rare enough. Notwithstanding the best of legal contracts 
and the surrender of sovereign immunities under New York, English, or other 
foreign law, in actual practice, rogue sovereign debtors can be held accountable 
or effectively restrained only by the forceful actions of other sovereigns.4 
During the nineteenth century, this was sometimes accomplished by the 
successful exercise of military force and, during the twentieth century, through 
the application of diplomatic, trade, and financial sanctions or incentives, both 
unilaterally and through multilateral organizations. 
 
II 
THE GOOD INTENTIONS 
 After repeated refinancings and deferrals of debt-service obligations to 
foreign commercial banks, and the accumulation of sizeable interest arrears 
(particularly from 1987 through 1994), the government of Ecuador finally 
reached a comprehensive debt-forgiveness and restructuring deal in 1995, under 
the aegis of the Brady Plan. The terms agreed to reflected creditor concessions 
that were more generous than those granted to any other Latin American 
government up to that moment; in particular, the discount bond—accepted by 
creditors willing to give up claims on principal owed—involved a forty-five 
percent “haircut” rather than the usual thirty-five percent.5 As in other Brady 
Plan applications, the various securities issued in exchange for old defaulted 
loans (in this instance the par, discount, past-due-interest, and interest-
equalization bonds) incorporated a number of legal innovations designed to 
make them virtually inviolable in any future economic emergency. First, they 
were freely transferrable bonds listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, 
precisely so their ownership could change over time and so they would not be 
easily traceable for the purpose of getting them restructured again. Second, the 
bonds that involved debt forgiveness or concessional interest rates and that had 
very long grace periods and maturities (the pars and discounts) were backed in 
 
ESTADÍSTICA MENSUAL, Sept. 2010, at tbl.3.3.1, available at http://www.bce.fin.ec/home1/estadisticas/ 
bolmensual/IEMensual.jsp. 
 4. See Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of 
Argentina’s Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 311, 331 (2005) (asserting that rogue debtors are a threat to the 
international financial architecture). 
 5. Lee C. Buchheit, How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 2000, 
at 17, 17. 
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part with good collateral (U.S. government zero-coupon bonds), so future 
governments would not be tempted to default merely to avoid servicing them. 
And, third, the new bonds contained “exit covenants” by which the obligor 
pledged neither to ask for a future restructuring of the securities nor to request 
additional funding from the holders of the bonds.6 
In addition, the Ecuador and other loan-for-Brady-bond exchanges were 
accompanied by concrete steps and pledges of improved macroeconomic 
policies and market-friendly structural reforms that would enhance the ability 
of governments and their successors to service the new financial obligations 
until their eventual maturity. In Ecuador’s case, good progress in terms of 
economic stabilization and structural reforms was made ahead of the Brady 
Plan’s implementation, with the support of the Washington-based multilateral 
agencies, moving the International Monetary Fund (IMF) twice (in 1992 and 
1994) to endorse a rescheduling of debts owed by the government of Ecuador to 
the official foreign-aid and export-financing agencies represented at the Paris 
Club. However, in 1995, the debt relief obtained in these reschedulings was 
squandered via increased military spending following a brief border war with 
Peru; and what had been a duly balanced government budget from 1993 
through 1994 became a string of deepening fiscal deficits—and renewed foreign 
indebtedness, including for armaments. Battered also by drought-related power 
shortages and the adverse repercussions of the financial crisis in Mexico, the 
economy stagnated that year, and the country’s vice president, who had been 
the driver of market-friendly economic reforms, fled Ecuador to evade arrest on 
charges of corruption.7 
Notwithstanding the good intentions incorporated into the 1995 debt-relief 
operation, by 1999, Ecuador was in very serious—indeed far more serious—
financial trouble. A decline in world oil prices, damaging floods occasioned by 
the El Niño weather phenomenon, a drop in capital inflows in the wake of the 
Asian and Russian financial woes, a major domestic banking crisis, and loose 
fiscal and monetary policies all combined to push the economy to the brink of 
ruin. During the second half of that year, Ecuador became the world’s first 
government to default on its Brady bonds. Ecuador defaulted as well on two 
Eurobonds that had been issued in better days (1997) and on dollar-
denominated domestic obligations maturing in the short run. In a desperate 
move, the government officially dollarized the economy in January 2000, but 
soon after, the president was deposed and was replaced by his vice president. 
As financial stability and improved macroeconomic policies took hold, the IMF 
 
 6. Lee C. Buchheit, The Evolution of Debt Restructuring Techniques, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 
1992, at 10, 12. 
 7. Stanley Fisher, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, Remarks at the Hoover 
Institution Conference on Currency Unions: Ecuador and the IMF (May 19, 2000), available at http:// 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2000/051900.htm. 
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offered its financial support in April of that year—provided that substantial 
debt relief was obtained from foreign private creditors.8 
In July of 2000, with the IMF’s backing, the government sought and 
obtained a second round of principal forgiveness from its creditors, estimated at 
around forty percent of face value. Bondholders were presented with a take-it-
or-leave-it exchange offer whereby they would get new, uncollateralized 
obligations due in 2030 that paid very little interest, at least in the initial years, 
in exchange for their long-dated Brady bonds, to which a heavy discount was 
applied, and for their short-dated Eurobonds, to which no discount was applied. 
If creditors had opted instead for a bond paying a high interest rate and 
maturing in 2012, they would have had to concede an additional thirty-five 
percent “haircut” on the principal owed by Ecuador. Some ninety-seven 
percent of all bondholders accepted the exchange offer, which gave Ecuador 
substantial debt reduction as well as significant cash-flow relief in the initial 
years.9 
The new bonds incorporated contractual innovations meant to reassure 
investors that the risk of future losses would be minimized and that the new 
securities had upside potential. As the venerable Lee Buchheit, New York 
counsel to the Republic of Ecuador, recounted, “A deliberate effort was . . . 
made to include structural features in the new bonds that would reduce the 
likelihood that the debt stock would become the subject of a third round of debt 
relief in the future.”10 The first legal innovation was to incorporate a pledge that, 
if there should be a default that was not cured within one year on the 2030 
bonds during the first decade after issuance, Ecuador would compensate 
bondholders: it would grant them additional 2030 bonds under a sliding scale, 
starting with an extra thirty percent of bonds if the default took place in the first 
four years after their original issuance. This principal-reinstatement provision 
sought not only to reassure those investors who had granted debt forgiveness 
that a meaningful portion of their original claims against Ecuador would be 
restored in case of a default, but also to discourage future Ecuadorian 
governments from defaulting by making it expensive for them to do so. 
The second legal novelty was to include a binding commitment that Ecuador 
would repurchase a specified percentage of both the outstanding 2012 and 2030 
bonds in each year starting six and eleven years after their issuance, 
respectively. These mandatory buybacks (at secondary-market prices) were 
 
 8. Id. (“The country needed both cash flow relief and debt reduction to secure a sustainable 
external and fiscal position for the medium term.”). 
 9. Lee C. Buchheit, supra note 5, at 18–19. A ceiling was placed on the overall issuance of 2012 
bonds and a cash payment was made on past-due interest and principal, funded by the collateral set 
aside when the Brady bonds had originally been issued. There was also an innovative, aggressive use of 
“exit consents” to penalize bondholders who might choose to retain their existing bonds; they would be 
rendered substantially inferior by the consent to various prejudicial amendments granted by 
bondholders entering into the debt exchange. The application of these exit consents surely helps to 
explain the high bondholder participation rate. Id. at 19–20. 
 10. Id. at 19. 
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intended to set investors’ minds at rest that the aggregate amount of Ecuador’s 
bonded debt would be gradually reduced to a smaller, more manageable size 
before the bonds matured and to reassure them that, by its actions, the 
government of Ecuador would help bolster the price of these securities in the 
secondary market. Ecuador’s failure to meet the debt-reduction targets in any 
one year would trigger a mandatory partial redemption of the bonds at par. 
However, this novelty was potentially quite advantageous also for Ecuador 
because it allowed the government to satisfy its amortization commitments by 
purchasing the bonds and retiring them whenever they traded at a discount in 
the secondary market—which they usually did, at prices in the range of fifty to 
sixty cents on the dollar. If the 2012 or 2030 bonds were ever to trade above par, 
the government could always make the amortization payments at par.11 
With the IMF’s blessing, the Paris Club subsequently refinanced 
accumulated arrears and maturities through April 2001. It did not grant any 
debt forgiveness, however, just as it had not done in the early 1990s. And yet 
Ecuador’s interest and principal arrears to official creditors were more than 
twice as large as they had been to commercial banks and bondholders before 
the refinancing.12 Evidently, while Ecuador was deemed (by the United States 
and European governments, as well as by the IMF’s management) to be 
insolvent enough to deserve major write-offs from private creditors twice in five 
years, it was considered solvent enough not to deserve write-offs from official 
creditors even once—despite being in the midst of the country’s arguably worst 
economic crisis. This was one of several instances in which the Paris Club’s 
principle of “comparable treatment” proved to be a highly discretionary one-
way street.13 It would take less than a decade for investors in vintage-2000 
Ecuador bonds to come to regret ever owning the new, and supposedly much-
improved, securities. 
 
 11. Id. at 19–20. This was one of the motivations for the government to set up a fund known as the 
Stabilization and Investment Fund for Petroleum Resources (FEIREP), infra p. 259, to provide a pool 
of cash to repurchase the 2012 and 2030 bonds opportunistically whenever they would trade at a deeper 
than usual discount. The government could also achieve the promised reduction in the stock of 
outstanding bonds by other means, such as debt for equity exchanges. 
 12. INT’L MONETARY FUND, ECUADOR: SELECTED ISSUES AND STATISTICAL ANNEX 141 tbl.47 
(2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2000/cr00125.pdf (demonstrating that as of 
May 2000, Ecuador’s arrears to bilateral agencies had reached $742 million, versus $311 million to 
commercial banks and bondholders). 
 13. Arturo C. Porzecanski, Debt Relief by Private and Official Creditors: The Record Speaks, 10 
INT’L FIN. 191, 204 (2007) (observing that during the 1990s, the Paris Club never granted debt relief to 
several governments in Asia and Latin America that did obtain debt relief from private creditors, and 
then in 2005–2006, the Paris Club benefited from debt prepayments made by Nigeria, Peru, and Russia, 
but did not insist that private creditors likewise receive prepayments). 
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III 
THE BAD OUTCOMES 
In late 2008 the current populist government of Ecuador, headed by 
President Rafael Correa, defaulted on the 2012 and 2030 sovereign bonds, 
claiming they were immoral and illegitimate obligations.14 At no point before or 
after the default—when Ecuador was repurchasing the bonds both indirectly 
(through the secondary market) and directly (through a buyback for thirty-five 
cents on the dollar)—did the government assert that servicing these obligations 
posed a financial hardship. There was no objective basis for doing so: in 2008, 
the public external debt was the least burdensome it had been in over three 
decades, relative to government revenues or to the gross domestic product 
(GDP). Moreover, the country’s central bank held more freely disposable 
international reserves ($6.5 billion) than it had ever accumulated before.15 The 
United States and Europe were in a financial crisis and world oil prices had 
plunged, but the Ecuadorian economy was unusually well positioned to 
withstand these exogenous shocks, which proved temporary anyway. Therefore, 
this default was not the consequence of a sovereign’s inability to pay.16 It was 
also out of character with Ecuador’s many prior defaults, which had taken place 
during major fiscal and economic emergencies. 
During the period from 2000 through 2005, the government’s external public 
indebtedness remained fairly steady averaging $11.25 billion, then declined to 
$10.1 billion by the time of the default, as repayments exceeded new 
disbursements because rising world oil prices provided a fiscal windfall that 
minimized Ecuador’s borrowing needs. The economy expanded steadily and the 
market value of Ecuador’s GDP ballooned from an abnormally depressed $16 
billion in 2000 to $54 billion by 2008. Consequently, by the time President 
Correa announced the default, the ratio of external public debt to GDP had 
dropped sharply from seventy percent in 2000 to a very manageable proportion 
of under twenty percent in 2008 (see Figure 1 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14. Simon Romero, Ecuador: President Orders Debt Default, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2008, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/13/world/americas/13briefs-PRESIDENTORD_BRF.html. 
 15. BANCO CENTRAL DEL ECUADOR, supra note 3, at tbl.1.2.1. 
 16. Fifteen months later, the finance minister would confirm that the December 2008 default was 
not triggered by any economic difficulties. See Press Release, Ministerio de Finanzas del Ecuador, La 
Moratoria de los Global 2012 y 2030 Fue por Ilegitimidad y No por Falta de Recursos (Mar. 4, 2010), 
available at http://mef.gov.ec/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/MINISTERIO_ECONOMIA_FINANZAS_ 
ECUADOR/ARCHIVOS_INFORMACION_IMPORTANTE/TAB138898/TAB190900/TAB203179/
BOLETIN07_04_03_2010.PDF. 
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Figure 1: Ecuador’s External Public Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
(including any interest or principal arrears)17 
 
 
Servicing this external indebtedness imposed an increasingly lighter burden 
on the country and its public finances, especially given the rapid growth of 
government revenues during the intervening years, from $4.2 billion in 2000 to 
$21.4 billion in 2008. The interest bill averaged $1 billion in 2000 and 2001, but 
it started to drop and settled at less than $700 million per annum in 2002 
through 2008. As a proportion of government revenues, interest payments 
dropped from over twenty-six percent in 2000 to under four percent in 2008, 
and in relation to GDP, they fell from seven percent to nearly one percent (see 
Figure 2 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17. Author’s calculations based on BANCO CENTRAL DEL ECUADOR, supra note 3. 
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Figure 2: Interest Payments on Ecuador’s External Public Debt 
(including any interest arrears)18 
 
 
In particular, the 2012 and 2030 bonds, which accounted for nearly one-third 
of the external public debt as of the end of 2008, required annual interest 
payments of $331 million, which is the equivalent of a mere 1.9% of 2008 
government revenues and 0.6% of 2008 GDP—a relatively insignificant amount 
by any standard. Even though revenues and GDP dropped somewhat in 2009 in 
the aftermath of the global recession, the burden of interest payments on the 
2012 and 2030 bonds would not have increased appreciably in the absence of a 
default. 
To understand the genesis of this decision to default out of unwillingness 
rather than inability to pay, it is necessary to paint a brief profile of President 
Correa. He was born in 1963 in the coastal city of Guayaquil to a family of 
modest means. Throughout his formative years—until age twenty-eight, in 
fact—he attended or was otherwise affiliated with Catholic schools and 
universities, mostly run by the Salesians, one of the world’s largest Catholic 
missionary orders. This upbringing included spending one year on a mission at a 
social center run by the Salesians in the Cotopaxi province, where Correa 
gained empathy for the native population by seeing their extreme poverty up 
close. In a speech delivered recently at Oxford entitled My Experience as a 
Leftist Christian in a Secular World, President Correa stated that his “economic 
principles are based on the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church and on 
 
 18. Author’s calculations based on BANCO CENTRAL DEL ECUADOR, supra note 3. 
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Liberation Theology.”19 He denounced the very unequal distribution of income 
in Latin America and said, “As a practicing Catholic, I will always believe in the 
importance of charity and solidarity,” and he pledged to keep ruling “with a 
clear preferential option for [helping] the poorest and the forgotten; and [for] 
prioritizing human beings over [the owners of] capital.”20 
Vice President Alfredo Palacio, a cardiologist with no business experience, 
“discovered” Correa in 2003, when Correa was an economics professor and 
consultant. Palacio retained Correa as his economic advisor on the issue of how 
to set up and pay for a universal health-care system, which had been one of 
Palacio’s campaign promises.21 At the time, funding for social programs was 
limited, and resources that might otherwise be available were not within reach 
because a portion of oil-related revenues was being deposited into a 
government fund known as the Stabilization and Investment Fund for 
Petroleum Resources (FEIREP).22 The fund was set up in 2002 largely to 
generate the fiscal savings necessary to pay for the buybacks required by the 
debt restructuring of 2000. Palacio and Correa tried to tap into the FEIREP to 
help fund a universal health-care system, but were unsuccessful. 
In March 2005, Correa presented a foreboding paper at a meeting sponsored 
by a regional council of Christian churches held to discuss Latin America’s 
foreign-debt problems. It was entitled Debt Exchange: It’s All About the 
Creditors, and in it, Correa denounced the 2000 restructuring as having 
delivered insufficient relief. To begin with, he wrote, Ecuador’s obligations 
should have been written down to then-prevailing prices in the secondary 
market—precisely the kind of massive forgiveness that Argentina was rightly 
demanding, he felt, from its creditors. Correa went on to denounce the FEIREP 
for starving the country of funds for social programs and for enriching 
bondholders by boosting the market price of Ecuador’s debt.23 
A few weeks later, on April 20, 2005, Palacio was appointed to the 
presidency when the legislature removed the incumbent, Lucio Gutiérrez. This 
followed a week of growing popular unrest and was done as political retribution 
against what was perceived as dictatorial decisions made by President Gutiérrez 
in prior months.24 Palacio, in turn, appointed Rafael Correa as his finance 
minister. Correa wasted no time in proposing to the legislature the abolition of 
 
 19. Rafael Correa, President of Ecuador, Address Before the Oxford Union Society: My 
Experience as a Leftist Christian in a Secular World 6 (Oct. 26, 2009), available at http:// 
www.presidencia.gov.ec/pdf/Discurso%20ingles.pdf. 
 20. Id. at 4, 11. 
 21. See Vida Política, DR. ALFREDO PALACIO, http://www.dralfredopalacio.org/actividades.htm 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2010).  
 22. Id. 
 23. Rafael Correa, Canje de Deuda: Todo en Función de los Acreedores, LA INSIGNIA, June 20, 
2005, available at http://www.lainsignia.org/2005/junio/econ_008.htm. The sponsoring regional council 
was Consejo Latinoamericano de Iglesias. 
 24. Monte Reel, Ecuadoran Congress Ousts President, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2005, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5002-2005Apr20.html. 
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the FEIREP, which it did in June while setting up an alternate fund (CEREPS), 
largely to underwrite social spending.25 This was done even though the FEIREP, 
which had accumulated $1.1 billion during its nineteen months of existence, had 
not spent a single dollar to buy back any foreign debt. According to the World 
Bank, the fund had been turned into “the piggy bank to finance the liquidity 
needs of the central government.”26 Correa also denounced the prior 
administration’s supposedly secret consent to various policy conditions imposed 
by the IMF and the World Bank, threatened to withhold debt-service payments 
to the multilateral agencies if they did not fulfill their loan commitments, and 
raised the possibility of bypassing the multilateral agencies altogether and 
selling bonds to Venezuela instead.27 
In late July, the World Bank made it known to Minister Correa that it would 
not authorize the disbursement of a $100-million loan he was counting on. 
Correa fired off an angry letter to World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz, telling 
him the Bank had offended Ecuador by reneging on the loan and demanding to 
know precisely why the disbursement had been cancelled.28 A couple of days 
later, having set himself proverbially ablaze, Minister Correa tendered his 
resignation at the request of President Palacio, whose office let it be known that 
the minister had failed to keep his superior properly informed of his 
(inflammatory) activities.29 During his 106 days in office, Correa had managed 
to ruin the government’s access to external funding, but by wrapping himself in 
the national flag to confront the Washington multilateral agencies, supposedly 
on behalf of the dispossessed of Ecuador, he had also succeeded in gaining 
national name recognition—thereby setting the stage for his candidacy in the 
next presidential election. Upon departure, Correa’s popular approval rating 
was fifty-seven percent, the highest among cabinet members and nearly twenty 
percentage points higher than President Palacio’s own.30 
Rafael Correa would go on to win the presidential election held in 
November 2006, and his inaugural address on January 15, 2007, presaged his 
get-tough attitude toward foreign bondholders. He stated that one of the main 
challenges facing Ecuador was to overcome a culture of issuing debt abroad, 
which had left the country saddled with “a very costly overindebtedness”—a 
 
 25. WORLD BANK, REPORT NO. 00000-EC, ECUADOR COUNTRY ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM: 
PROMOTING STABLE AND ROBUST ECONOMIC GROWTH 33 (2005), available at http://siteresources 
.worldbank.org/EXTEXPCOMNET/Resources/2463593-1213987636514/02_Ecuador.pdf. 
 26. Id. at 34. 
 27. Rafael Correa Renunció al Ministerio de Economía, EL UNIVERSO, Aug. 5, 2005, available at 
http://www.eluniverso.com/2005/08/05/0001/9/A99FF2FCCCAE4D70BE0A1E92B2AC69D1.html. 
 28. La Renuncia de Rafael Correa, Ministro de Economía de Ecuador: ¿Un Ejemplo de la 
Influencia de las IFIs?, CHOIKE, Aug. 16, 2005 [hereinafter La Renuncia], available at http:// 
ifis.choike.org/esp/informes/134.html. 
 29. Gobierno Niega Que Cambios en Áreas Económica y Petrolera Sean por Presiones, EL 
UNIVERSO, Aug. 5, 2005, available at http://www.eluniverso.com/2005/08/05/0001/9/0C25A623318045 
EBB1606CD1656A467B.html?p=9A&m=2349. 
 30. La Renuncia, supra note 28. 
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gross factual misrepresentation. He said a country’s debt service should be 
subject to a sustainability criterion; for example, debt-service burdens should 
not be incompatible with the achievement of the United Nations’ Millennium 
Development Goals. He also stated that part of Ecuador’s foreign debt was 
illegitimate, had been acquired under dubious circumstances, was not used for 
its intended purposes, and had been “repaid several times” already.31 Ideally, 
President Correa acknowledged, governments should be able to appeal to an 
impartial and transparent international tribunal that would determine which 
obligations should be serviced and a country’s objective capacity to pay. He 
noted, however, that such an impartial third-party forum does not exist; there is 
only the IMF, “the creditors’ representative.”32 This is why, Correa concluded, 
his administration would engage in a “firm and sovereign renegotiation of the 
external debt, above all of the inadmissible conditions that were imposed on us 
in the debt exchange of 2000.”33 
Nearly six months later, on July 9, 2007, President Correa issued a decree 
authorizing the creation of an Integral Auditing Commission for the Public 
Credit (CAIC) and charged it with determining the “legitimacy, legality, 
transparency, quality, efficacy and efficiency” of the domestic and foreign 
public debt contracted between 1976 and 2006, taking into consideration “the 
legal and financial aspects, and its economic and social impact on regions, the 
ecology and various nationalities and peoples.”34 The CAIC was to analyze not 
just each bond issued at home and abroad, but also each and every loan 
contracted with official bilateral and multilateral agencies, as well as with 
commercial banks and suppliers, during the past three decades. It was to 
determine who had authorized the indebtedness in question, whether the 
requisite feasibility studies had been conducted, what conditions had been 
imposed, to what purpose the funds had been allocated in actual practice, and 
the comprehensive (“integral”) impact of each project thus underwritten, 
among other matters.35 And it was to accomplish this mission within one year, 
although later on the CAIC was given an extra couple of months—until the end 
of September 2008—to achieve what any reasonable observer would regard as a 
“Mission Impossible.” The CAIC was not even allocated any funding to hire a 
 
 31. Rafael Correa, President of Ecuador, Discurso de Rafael Correa Presidente de Ecuador 
[Inaugural Address] 4–5 (Jan. 15, 2007), available at http://www.coberturadigital.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2007/01/DISCURSO%20de%20Rafael%20Correa%20Presidente%20del%20Ecuador.doc 
(author’s translation). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 6. 
 34. COMISIÓN DE AUDITORÍA INTEGRAL DEL CRÉDITO PUBLICO [CAIC], INFORME FINAL DE 
LA AUDITORÍA INTEGRAL DE LA DEUDA ECUATORIANA: DECRETO EJECUTIVO 472, arts. 2, 3(a) at 
156 (2007) (Ecuador) [hereinafter CAIC REPORT]. The Spanish version of the CAIC REPORT is 
available at http://www.auditoriadeuda.org.ec/images/stories/documentos/Libro_CAIC_Espanol.pdf 
.zip. The CAIC produced an English version of this report, which is available at http://www 
.auditoriadeuda.org.ec/images/stories/documentos/Libro_CAIC_English.pdf.zip, but the translation is 
so poor that all quotes from the report are translations by this author from the Spanish original. 
 35. Id. art. 3(b). 
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staff until December 2007. Nevertheless, it managed to deliver a preliminary 
report in February 2008, a second draft in July, and its final report in November 
2008.36 
The CAIC’s designated members were four representatives of the Correa 
Administration, including the then finance minister plus six other Ecuadorians 
and three foreigners from social organizations who had worked on debt issues 
in Ecuador or elsewhere.37 However, none were professional auditors, and all 
had a long history of militancy in the debt-forgiveness or debt-repudiation 
movement.38 The CAIC was chaired by Ricardo Patiño, an extreme leftist who 
in his early years had joined the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and had 
later held a post in the Sandinista government’s land-reform agency. Upon 
returning to Ecuador, Patiño set up the country’s Jubilee 2000 office, part of the 
international-coalition movement that called for the cancellation of third-world 
debt by the year 2000.39 He was appointed finance minister in January 2007, but 
a couple of weeks after being named to chair the CAIC, he stepped down from 
this cabinet post because of a scandal involving the alleged manipulation of 
Ecuador’s bonded debt. He was immediately given another cabinet post by 
Correa,40 and despite the appearance of impropriety and of a conflict of interest, 
Patiño was kept as the chairman of the CAIC.41 
The CAIC’s report was written in great haste, without the benefit of having 
hired professional auditors; interviewing public credit officers, finance 
ministers, or living presidents from 1976 through 2006; or obtaining access to 
many important documents.42 The report’s authors reveal that they requested 
 
 36. Hugo Arias Palacios, La Deuda Ecuatoriana y la Auditoría, in SOBRE LA DEUDA ILEGÍTIMA: 
APORTES AL DEBATE 129 (Gabriela Weber ed., 2008), available at http://www.flacsoandes.org/biblio/ 
shared/biblio_view.php?bibid=111618&tab=opac. Arias Palacios was a member of the CAIC. 
 37. Id. at 127. 
 38. For example, Jubilee, Eurodad, and LATINDADD. Id. Comisionados con Historial Antideuda, 
EL COMERCIO, Nov. 22, 2008 (on file with author). 
 39. Funcionarios “Clave” Están Más Cerca de Correa, DIARIO HOY, Dec. 16, 2007, available at 
http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/funcionarios-clave-estan-mas-cerca-de-correa-284778-284778 
.htm. 
 40. As of this writing, Patiño in fact is holding his fourth cabinet post, as the country’s minister for 
foreign affairs. See Ricardo Patiño Es el Nuevo Canciller del Ecuador, EL UNIVERSO, Jan. 21, 2010, 
available at http://www.eluniverso.com/2010/01/21/1/1355/ricardopationuevocancillerrepublica.html. 
 41. A month after becoming finance minister, Patiño had said he might delay a $135-million 
interest payment on the foreign debt, but then did not. This led to “wild swings in the value of 
Ecuador’s bonds and derivatives linked to them, raising suspicions of a deliberate market 
manipulation.” In May 2007, a video surfaced of a meeting between Patiño and three others in which 
the minister appeared to discuss a plan that would enable certain investors to make a great deal of 
money from the bond price swings. Minister Patiño denied any wrongdoing, but after the Ecuadorian 
congress censured him in July 2007, another video surfaced showing him arranging a backroom deal 
with the head of Ecuador’s congress, whereupon he moved to another cabinet post. See Caught on 
Camera, ECONOMIST, July 26, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com/node/9546462. 
 42. For example, former president Sixto Durán Ballén (1992–1996) said he was never contacted by 
the CAIC to hear his version of events surrounding the issuance of Brady bonds and that the CAIC 
report was full of inaccuracies. See Sixto Durán Ballén Indignado por Informe de Deuda, EL 
COMERCIO, Nov. 21, 2008 (on file with author). 
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information from eighteen government agencies, but never heard back from 
three of them, were given information that was not relevant by eleven of them, 
and obtained the documents they were seeking from just four agencies.43 In 
particular, the armed forces, known to have contracted many a foreign loan for 
the purchase of armaments (as confirmed by documents held by the finance 
ministry), had the audacity to issue a statement to the CAIC stating that they 
“had not found any documentation that details any loans received from foreign 
commercial banks during the period 1976–2006.”44 
As was to be expected given the circumstances, the CAIC report is 
incomplete, biased, and inaccurate. For example, the first misdeed it identifies 
involves none other than the United States Federal Reserve, which is accused of 
“illegally raising interest rates,” thereby causing Ecuador’s debt to snowball 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s.45 The accusation of illegality is ridiculous, 
of course. Moreover, a factual analysis based on official Ecuadorian statistics, 
which are publicly available, reveals that the temporary hike in U.S. interest 
rates under Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker may explain, at best, a 
small fraction of the debt buildup that took place in those years. Ecuador’s 
public external indebtedness grew to $5 billion as of the end of 1982 from less 
than $2 billion at the end of 1978, but only about one-third of this increase 
could be justified by the need to borrow to cover the higher interest payments.46 
Besides, while U.S. interest rates were being hiked, Ecuador was 
simultaneously benefiting from a doubling in its oil-export revenues, such that 
the government should have been able to afford the higher interest bill without 
recourse to extra borrowing.47 Indeed, despite a near halving of U.S. rates 
between the end of 1982 and the end of 1987, the government’s external debt 
went on to double to $10 billion. In sum, there is no basis for pinning Ecuador’s 
debt snowball on the Federal Reserve. 
The other accusations of “illegality” made in the CAIC report target prior 
administrations, charging them with having violated either mostly unspecified 
Ecuadorian laws or “basic principles of international law.”48 Some examples of 
these transgressions are that prior administrations agreed to submit debt 
contracts to foreign jurisdiction (namely, New York and English law), to waive 
Ecuador’s sovereign immunity, and to accept conditions imposed by official 
multilateral agencies “in violation of basic principles of international law such 
 
 43. CAIC REPORT, supra note 34, RESUMEN EJECUTIVO 28 (2008).  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 26. 
 46. If the average interest rate paid by the government on its external debt had remained at its 
1978 level of 7.4%, the cumulative interest bill from 1979 through 1982 would have been $1.1 billion 
lower than it actually was; however, the stock of indebtedness during this period jumped by $3.2 billion. 
See BANCO CENTRAL DEL ECUADOR, supra note 3, at ch. 2 tbl.2.12. 
 47. In fact, the central government’s interest bill on foreign debt went up by $110 million between 
1978 and 1981, but its oil-related revenues increased by $360 million. BANCO CENTRAL DEL 
ECUADOR, supra note 3, at ch. 3 tbl.3.5. 
 48. CAIC REPORT, supra note 34, at 34. 
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as the equality of sovereign states, the self-determination of peoples, the non-
interference in the internal affairs of nations, the right to [economic] 
development, and the respect of human rights.”49 There are also multiple 
accusations of “irregularities,” like prior administrations’ prepaying debts (in 
the context of debt-refinancing agreements) when they were under no 
obligation to do so, and the government’s taking over private-sector obligations 
from 1983 through 1984 in the midst of a major economic crisis without auditing 
the beneficiaries to check whether their obligations were indeed still 
outstanding.50 
The CAIC report also censures loans obtained from foreign bilateral and 
multilateral agencies on a variety of grounds. For example, funding from the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was used to 
purchase collateral to back the Brady bonds, “thereby aiding and abetting the 
reallocation of funds for purposes other than those contemplated in the lending 
programs previously agreed.”51 Prior administrations had also accepted various 
conditions imposed by official foreign creditors, had not prevented cost 
overruns in various projects funded by foreign loans, and had not carried out 
the necessary environmental and other impact studies.52 A number of specific 
projects are examined and sufficient objections raised about how they had been 
implemented to support the CAIC report’s recommendation of the repudiation 
of the multilateral loans involved.53 
Ominously, the CAIC report criticizes prior administrations for having 
“overpaid” greatly when they restructured their foreign obligations, particularly 
during the two bond exchanges in 1995 and 2000.54 With a perspective surely 
inspired by Argentina’s harsh treatment of its own bondholders, the report 
points out the costly “mistakes” of recognizing and capitalizing interest arrears, 
and the failure to base their negotiation with creditors on prices for Ecuador’s 
defaulted debt as observed in the secondary market.55 Prior to the Brady bond 
exchange, the report noted, Ecuador owed $4.5 billion of principal plus $2.5 
billion of past-due interest; but its obligations were trading in the secondary 
market at around twenty-five cents on the dollar, so that should have set the 
basis for the discount (seventy-five percent) applied during the debt-for-Brady-
bonds exchange.56 Likewise, in 2000, the Brady bonds and Eurobonds were 
 
 49. Id. Prior governments are also accused of failing to register Ecuador’s bonds with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission—because they were issued under Rule 144A and Regulation S, 
in full compliance with U.S. securities laws. The CAIC took this type of bond issuance as evidence of a 
lack of transparency. Id. at 59. 
 50. Id. at 28, 38. 
 51. Id. at 151. 
 52. Id. at 151–52. 
 53. Id. at 104, 152. 
 54. See id. at 42, 46 (discussing the actual debt Ecuador had and the debt they incurred after the 
restructuring of the bonds). 
 55. See id. at 46–47. 
 56. Id. at 42. 
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trading at around thirty cents on the dollar, so they should have been 
restructured on that basis (a seventy percent “haircut”), in which case only $1 
billion of 2012 and 2030 bonds would have been issued instead of nearly $4 
billion.57 
IV 
THE DEFAULT AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 The CAIC report was formally delivered to President Correa on November 
20, 2008, but by then, he was well aware of its contents—he had been handed a 
preliminary draft on October 23—and had already ordered that an upcoming 
$31 million coupon payment on the 2012 bonds be skipped.58 A formal default 
on the foreign debt was declared on December 12. Starting that day, Correa 
would justify the country’s moratorium on the basis that Ecuador’s debt 
obligations were “immoral,” “illegal,” or “illegitimate”—preferably, all of the 
above. On December 15, it was announced that an upcoming $30.5 million 
coupon payment on a ten-year sovereign bond that had been issued in 
December 2005 would likewise not be made.59 Yet as the weeks and months 
passed, it became apparent that Ecuador’s default would be highly selective 
rather than indiscriminate, and that it would lead neither to a repudiation of 
obligations as odious60 or on other grounds, nor to a negotiated or even 
unilateral debt exchange (Argentine style) for the purpose of obtaining massive 
debt forgiveness.61 
President Correa made clear on December 20 that all obligations to official 
bilateral and multilateral agencies would continue to be serviced in full and on 
time, notwithstanding the CAIC’s damning report and his own prior 
announcement that even debts deemed “legitimate” would be subject to 
restructuring.62 He and his finance minister, María Elsa Viteri, explained before 
and after the New Year that the default would be confined to the “commercial” 
debt, meaning Ecuador’s three sovereign bonds. In mid-January 2009, however, 
the government surprisingly decided to pay the coupon on the 2015 bond just 
before the grace period ran out, saying that its issuance was different from that 
 
 57. Id. at 46–47. 
 58. Press Release, Ministerio de Finanzas del Ecuador, Ecuador se Acoge a Período de Mora 
Técnica de Bonos Global (Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://mef.gov.ec/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ 
MINISTERIO_ECONOMIA_FINANZAS_ECUADOR/SUBSECRETARIAS/DIRECCION_DE_ 
COMUNICACION_SOCIAL/PRODUCTOS_COMUNICACION_PRENSA/ARCHIVOS_2008_1/ 
027.14NOVIEMBRE2008.PDF. 
 59. Ecuador Suspendió Pagos de Intereses de Global 2015, EL UNIVERSO, Dec. 15, 2008, available 
at http://www.eluniverso.com/2008/12/15/1/1356/C1E256567062492F936E2CA95EEE5F9A.htm. 
 60. See Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debt, 56 
DUKE L.J. 1201, 1216 (2007). 
 61. See generally Porzecanski, supra note 4. 
 62. Correa Promete Pagar Créditos a Organismos Regionales, EL UNIVERSO, Dec. 20, 2008, 
available at http://www.eluniverso.com/2008/12/20/1/1356/C1C7C6EF017C47FF8703BC700C78146B 
.html. 
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of the other two—even though the CAIC report had condemned the 2015 bond 
right along with the others.63 By February, it became clear that the government 
was really targeting only the two bonds Correa had been despising for years, so 
it came as no surprise when the government failed to pay $135 million in 
interest due on the 2030 bonds. 
The way the Correa Administration dealt with these undesirable obligations 
was to buy them back from intimidated investors, indirectly at first and then 
directly, paying cash for a fraction of their face value (or rather, their pre-
default market value), for the purpose of extinguishing them. The government 
reportedly began to purchase the 2012 bonds in the secondary market after 
their price collapsed following the mid-November 2008 decision to default on 
them, using an Ecuadorian bank as the front man.64 It then continued 
repurchasing its securities after defaulting on the 2030 bond, such that by one 
estimate, the government picked up as much as half of the two bond issues in 
this manner.65 On April 20, 2009, the government announced a buyback offer to 
repurchase the 2012 and 2030 bonds through a modified Dutch auction with a 
base price of thirty cents on the dollar.66 A disclosure document was circulated 
by the deal’s manager, Lazard Frères, with an expiration date of May 15 for all 
offers. The document made plain that Ecuador had “no intention of resuming 
payments on these bonds following the [e]xpiration [d]ate.”67 Despite an 
attempt to organize resistance among bondholders, ninety-one percent of the 
bonds outstanding were tendered—presumably including those in government 
 
 63. The proceeds of that bond issue had been devoted by a prior administration to repurchase a 
portion of the 2012 bonds at par, in accordance with the commitment made at the time of the 2000 debt 
exchange. Because of this, the 2015 bond could have been regarded by President Correa as guilty of 
immorality, illegality, or illegitimacy by association—which was the view adopted by the CAIC. CAIC 
REPORT, supra note 34, at 47. 
 64. Ecuador Habría Comprado Su Deuda, EL COMERCIO, Dec. 11, 2008; Analytica Investments, 
ECUADOR WKLY. REP., Dec. 14–20, 2008 (on file with author). The bank was allegedly Banco del 
Pacífico, acting through a broker. 
 65. See Lester Pimentel, Ecuador Plays Bond Market for Fools, Aberdeen Says (Update2), 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 16, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601013 
&sid=aQ7ZViOQQ4mI. The Correa Administration has yet to admit or deny the allegations of these 
back-door purchases, but if they did take place, that might help explain a portion of the precipitous 
drop in the central bank’s international reserves, from over $6 billion just prior to the November 2008 
announcement that the 2012 bond coupon would not be paid, to less than $3.5 billion by March 2009 
after the 2030 bond coupon went unpaid. However, capital flight in the wake of the default 
announcement probably accounts for most of this drop in dollar reserves. For data on said reserves, see 
BANCO CENTRAL DEL ECUADOR, INFORMACIÓN MONETARIA SEMANAL, No. 155, at tbl.IMS2 
(2010), available at http://www.bce.fin.ec/home1/estadisticas/bolsemanal/Coyuntura.jsp. 
 66. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, The Coroner’s Inquest, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 2009, 
at 22, 22 (“It was the first time in modern history that a sovereign debtor had demanded that its 
external commercial creditors write off most of their claims . . . without advancing a plausible argument 
that financial distress warranted such extraordinary debt relief.”). 
 67. Ministerio de Finanzas del Ecuador, Noteholder Circular, Apr. 20, 2009, at 15, available at 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/files/2009/04/noteholder-circular-goe-bond-offer.pdf; see also 
Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 66, at 4–5 (discussing why the bonds’ trustee did not exercise its 
discretion to accelerate either bond or to start an enforcement action, and the lessons learned about 
how a trustee indenture in sovereign documentation should read in the future). 
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hands—and were bought back at a discount of between sixty-five and seventy 
percent, thereby retiring nearly $3 billion in bonds for around $900 million in 
cash payments. Holdouts were then offered another chance to tender at thirty-
five cents on the dollar, and in November 2009, an offer aimed at Italian 
investors was launched on identical terms. As a result, by the end of 2009, the 
government had successfully bought back about ninety-five percent of the 2012 
and 2030 bonds.68 
Obviously, this manner of dealing with a sovereign’s debt burden hinges on 
having more ample cash resources on hand than necessary to meet the interest 
payments falling due. It is neither an affordable strategy for a sovereign that is 
experiencing an acute liquidity crisis nor a smart strategy for a solvent sovereign 
able to refinance its obligations at lower interest rates—the far more common 
situations encountered in the practice of sovereign international finance. It also 
presupposes attaching little cost to damaging the issuer’s (already tattered) 
reputation as a debtor, as well as having no intention of regaining access to the 
international bond markets—at least not for many years. The government of 
Ecuador had been able to tap the international bond markets on one occasion 
(in December 2005), six years after its prior default, when the 2015 bond was 
issued. However, the Correa Administration soon made it known that it did not 
intend to return to the international private-capital markets. Its plan has been 
to rely on external financing from governments such as China, Iran, and Russia 
and from official multilateral agencies—preferably other than the IMF and the 
World Bank, regarded with long-standing animosity by President Correa.69 
Evidently, the authorities did not care that their default would cause 
collateral damage, triggering capital flight and impairing the ability of 
Ecuadorian banks and corporations to access financing from foreign 
commercial creditors at a time of global financial turmoil. According to central-
bank data, the private sector in Ecuador was able to borrow much less from 
abroad after the default than it had borrowed before, such that because 
repayments exceeded disbursements, the stock of its external-debt obligations 
 
 68. Ecuador Retiró Unos $50 Millones de Bonos Globales 2012 y 2030, EL UNIVERSO, Dec. 31, 
2009, available at http://www.eluniverso.com/2009/12/30/1/1356/ecuador-retiro-unos-millones-bonos-
globales.html. According to official statistics, the government’s principal due on 2012 and 2030 bonds 
dropped from a combined $3.21 billion at the end of 2008 to $223 million a year later, a ninety-three-
percent reduction. See Ministerio de Finanzas del Ecuador, Boletines Deuda Externa, MÓDULO DE 
INFORMACIÓN DE FINANZAS PÚBLICAS, Dec. 2008, at tbl.1 [hereinafter Deuda Externa Dec. 2008], 
available at http://mef.gov.ec/stgcPortal/faces/uploads/bulletin/DE_DIC2008.htm; Ministerio de 
Finanzas del Ecuador, Boletines Deuda Externa, MÓDULO DE INFORMACIÓN DE FINANZAS PÚBLICAS, 
Dec. 2009, at tbl.1 [hereinafter Deuda Externa Dec. 2009], available at http://mef.gov.ec/stgcPortal/ 
faces/uploads/bulletin/DE_DIC2009.htm. 
 69. Press Release, Ministerio de Finanzas del Ecuador, Ministra de Finanzas Comparece a 
Comisión de lo Económico y Tributario (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://mef.gov.ec/pls/portal/docs/ 
PAGE/MINISTERIO_ECONOMIA_FINANZAS_ECUADOR/SUBSECRETARIAS/DIRECCION
_DE_COMUNICACION_SOCIAL/PRODUCTOS_COMUNICACION_PRENSA/BOLETINES_D 
E_PRENSA/BOLETINES_2009/BOLETINES/BOLETIN32_19_NOV_2009.PDF. In 2007, President 
Correa expelled the World Bank and IMF resident representatives from Ecuador. 
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dropped by over fifteen percent between September 2008 and December 2009.70 
Surveys of foreign banks’ exposure to banks and corporations in Ecuador reveal 
an absolute drop of twelve percent in the year after September 2008 versus a 
fall of six percent to these obligors throughout Latin America during the same 
period.71 
The deplorable fact is that no leading government or any official 
multilateral agency based in Washington or Latin America went on record to 
express any dismay at Ecuador’s latest default and alleged bond-market 
manipulation. On the contrary, the local representatives of the regional 
development banks uttered words of moral support, and their headquarters 
provided an indirect blessing to the default and debt buyback by ramping up 
their lending to the government—despite an obvious deterioration in Ecuador’s 
creditworthiness and macroeconomic fundamentals in 2009. The Inter-
American Development Bank’s representative in Ecuador, Carlos Melo, stated 
that “[t]he good results obtained [in the restructuring] will benefit all 
Ecuadorians during difficult times . . . . The IADB reiterates its predisposition 
to work alongside Ecuadorians to promote economic development.”72 Sure 
enough, the IADB stepped up its approval of new loans to Ecuador, agreeing to 
$515 million in new loans in 2009 versus a mere $50 million in 2008.73 
The Colombia-based Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), for its part, 
made a general-purpose $480-million loan to Ecuador in July 2009; it had not 
lent anything to the government in the three prior years.74 And the Venezuela-
headquartered Andean Development Corporation (CAF) approved $873 
million in loans to the Correa Administration in 2009, an increase from $604 
million in 2008.75 The CAF’s representative in Ecuador, Luis Palau-Rivas, said 
in May 2009 that the regional lender saw the defaulted-debt restructuring 
“positively because it’s a voluntary process [that is] helping to solve a difficult 
situation . . . and will benefit everyone.”76 The idea that Ecuador’s bondholders 
were participants in “a voluntary process” is ludicrous, of course. As one 
 
 70. Banco Central del Ecuador, Movimiento de la Deuda Externa Privada, INFORMACIÓN 
ESTADÍSTICA MENSUAL, Jan. 2010, at tbl.3.3.2, available at http://www.bce.fin.ec/documentos/ 
PublicacionesNotas/Catalogo/IEMensual/m1895/IEM-332.xls. 
 71. See Bank for Int’l Settlements, Consolidated International Claims of BIS Reporting Banks, 
CONSOLIDATED BANKING STATISTICS, 3d Quarter 2009, at tbls.9A:A, 9A:G, available at 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm. 
 72. Alexandra Valecia & Alonso Soto, Regional Lenders Back Ecuador in Debt Talks, REUTERS, 
May 18, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE54H58220090518. 
 73. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 38, available at 
http://www.iadb.org/ar/2008; INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 2009, 45, 
available at http://www.iadb.org/ar/2009/. 
 74. Economic Studies Division, FLAR, Member Countries: About Ecuador, FONDO 
LATINOAMERICANO DE RESERVAS [FLAR] (Sept. 27, 2010), at tbl. Loans Granted, https://www.flar 
.net/ingles/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=216&conID=669. 
 75. CAF in Figures, ANDEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION [CAF], at tbl. [Loan] Approvals, 
http://www.caf.com/view/index.asp?ms=19&pageMs=62012 (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). 
 76. Valecia & Soto, supra note 72. 
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veteran financial reporter rightly commented at the time, since the bondholders 
had no say whatsoever in the unilateral destruction of the value of their 
investments, their only “choice” was whether to accept Ecuador’s risible offer 
or to hold onto defaulted Ecuadorian paper indefinitely.77 Beyond the 
supportive signals they sent to the government of Ecuador throughout the 
default, the multilateral agencies ended up disbursing nearly $860 million to the 
country in 2009, 152% more than the $340 million they had disbursed in 2008.78 
The Correa Administration requested no loans or other support from the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 2008 or 2009, and probably 
did not consult with them, either. But when a reporter asked the IMF about its 
attitude towards Ecuador’s default, the institution’s spokeswoman lamely said, 
It is longstanding [IMF] policy to encourage our members to, wherever possible, be 
current in servicing debt obligations, and when they are economically unsustainable to 
enter into productive negotiations [with their creditors]. We understand that 
Ecuador’s decision to default on these bonds is based on a dispute about [their] legal 
validity rather than [on] debt sustainability [grounds], and of course we don’t take 
sides on the merits.79 
All things considered, the official community’s tacit approval of Ecuador’s 
default is deeply troubling.80 In practice, only governments and multilateral 
organizations, rather than any group of private-sector bondholders, banks, or 
suppliers, could have reined in a wayward sovereign debtor such as Ecuador in 
2009—or Argentina from 2002 through the present, for that matter. As became 
evident in the 1980s, 1990s, and again during the recent global financial crisis, 
only the official community can exercise the kind of collective diplomatic 
pressure and put forth the financial incentives and disincentives necessary to 
motivate sovereigns to comply with their financial obligations—or at least to 
treat private creditors in a relatively responsible manner. This much was 
obvious even before bondholders obtained their many pyrrhic victories in New 
York and European courts in the wake of Argentina’s gigantic default. Legal 
precedents and plenty of indenture innovations notwithstanding, even the best 
of contract intentions cannot prevent investors from going through a hellish 
experience at the hands of a sovereign debtor unwilling to honor the spirit and 
the letter of its legal commitments. 
 
 77. Felix Salmon, Is the Obama Administration Condoning Ecuador’s Default?, REUTERS, May 18, 
2009, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/18/is-the-obama-administration-
condoning-ecuadors-default/. 
 78. Deuda Externa Dec. 2008, supra note 68; Deuda Externa Dec. 2009, supra note 68. 
 79. Caroline Atkinson, Dir. of External Relations, International Monetary Fund, Remarks at the 
Regular Press Briefing (Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2008/tr121808 
.htm. 
 80. Some would say that the United States and other leading governments, as well as the 
multilateral organizations, were too distracted and worried about the world financial crisis that erupted 
in September 2008 to concern themselves with Ecuador’s default. The international financial context 
may have played a role in explaining the lack of official reaction in December 2008, when the default 
was announced, but not throughout the first half of 2009, when the worldwide crisis eased and the 
Correa Administration could have been taken to task. 
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Interestingly, just as Ecuador’s selective default and buyback attracted no 
opprobrium in official or multilateral circles, it did not gather any plaudits from 
the debt-cancellation movement either. From 2007 through 2008, virtually all 
national, regional, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
agitating for massive forgiveness of developing-country debt, hailed Ecuador’s 
decision to conduct a thorough “independent” audit of its external 
indebtedness. Dozens of such organizations sent an open letter to President 
Correa in 2008 expressing their support for the audit, and favorable 
declarations along the same lines were made by legal experts meeting in Quito 
that July as well as by participants in a symposium on illegitimate debt that 
gathered in Oslo in October 2008, among others.81 To our knowledge, though, 
not one of these organizations has expressed its approval of how Ecuador went 
about dealing with the results and recommendations of the CAIC audit. In fact, 
a November 2009 meeting of nearly thirty organizations—in Ecuador, of all 
places—made no mention in its Guayaquil Declaration of how the host country 
had dealt with its “immoral,” “illegal,” and “illegitimate” debt obligations.82 
This deafening silence on the part of the advocates for across-the-board 
debt cancellation is understandable. The case of Ecuador does not fit the 
odious-debt doctrine or related grounds for repudiation. To begin with, the 
country has been under continuous civilian, constitutional rule since mid-1979. 
Though it has been mismanaged, it was not plundered by an egomaniacal 
dictator. The greatest build-up in foreign public indebtedness took place from 
1980 through 1994, when the sum total of obligations (including arrears) 
skyrocketed from less than $3 billion to nearly $14 billion, tripling even in 
relation to rising government revenues and GDP.83 During this extended period, 
duly elected civilians were in charge, none of whom has been found guilty of 
any illegal conduct. Issues of state succession, war-related debts, widespread 
corruption, the absence of informed consent, or collusion on the part of 
creditors to divert funds for contrary purposes—none of these criteria seem 
applicable here. Nor are the charges of illegitimacy made by the CAIC and 
President Correa those usually offered as strong arguments for debt 
cancellation, such as obligations that involve predatory terms, that cannot be 
serviced without violating basic human rights, or that go against widely 
accepted legal, financial, or ethical standards. 
What is a supporter of debt cancellation to make of the very arbitrary 
manner in which the Correa Administration proceeded—accepting 
 
 81. CAIC REPORT, supra note 34, at 161–64. INTERNAL AUDITING COMM’N FOR PUB. CREDIT OF 
ECUADOR, FINAL REPORT OF THE INTEGRAL AUDITING OF THE ECUADORIAN DEBT 165–68 
(containing declarations of support that do not appear in the Spanish version of the report). 
 82. Declaración de Guayaquil, RED LATINOAMERICANA SOBRE DEUDA, DESARROLLO Y 
DERECHO [LATINDADD] (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.latindadd.org/index.php?option=com 
_content&view=article&id=552:declaracion-de-guayaquil&catid=37:pronunc&Itemid=115. 
Participating institutions included CADTM, CLAI, Jubilee, and LATINDADD. 
 83. Author’s calculations based on BANCO CENTRAL DEL ECUADOR, supra note 3, at ch. 2 
tbl.2.12. 
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responsibility for every loan made to Ecuador by every official (bilateral and 
multilateral) foreign lender, even though the CAIC documented plenty of 
irregularities involving many of them? And what about the decision to default 
selectively on two bonds, but not on a third one that the CAIC had tarred and 
feathered just the same? How could someone from that camp express approval 
for a government that spent its “hard-earned money” buying back supposedly 
immoral, illegal, and illegitimate obligations, thereby validating them? 
 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The story of Ecuador’s repudiation of its debt in this unprincipled way is the 
cautionary tale of the bad things that can happen to good sovereign debt 
contracts. It is one that even experienced international lawyers, bankers, 
analysts, and investors would be well advised to heed. 
 
